

CONTEXT ANALYSIS – WARSAW, POLAND

Authors:

- **Olga Czeranowska**
- **Paweł Kaczmarczyk**
- **Marta Pachocka**
- **Anna Rosińska**
- **Justyna Salamońska**
- **Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada**
- **Dominik Wach**

Political, economic and social background of the country\local area and general current challenges

Poland is located in Central Europe. Since 2004, it has been one of the Member States of the European Union, and in 2007, it joined the Schengen area. Its borders consist of the EU's external borders with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and internal borders shared with other EU members, i.e. with Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Germany; in the north it has access to the Baltic Sea. In 2017, Poland had about 38.4 million inhabitants¹. The economic situation of Poland has been rather favourable in recent years. Real GDP growth was positive each year from 2006 to 2016, and Poland recorded positive rates of annual change also during the financial and economic crisis in Europe. The average growth rate between 2006 and 2016 was 3.5% per annum; only in 2016, it was 2.7%². The national currency is the Polish zloty (PLN); Poland still has not adopted the euro and therefore does not belong to the euro zone. According to Eurostat, the employment rate³ was 70.9% in

¹ Central Statistical Office of Poland (2018). Available at: <http://stat.gov.pl/en/basic-data/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

² Eurostat: Statistics Explained (2018). *National accounts and GDP*. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/National_accounts_and_GDP#Developments_in_GDP_in_the_EU:_growth_since_2013 (last visit: 24.06.2018).

³ According to Eurostat, the employment rate of the total population is calculated by dividing the number of person aged 20 to 64 in employment by the total population of the same age group. The indicators are based on the EU Labour Force Survey.

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

Poland compared to 72.2% for the EU in 2017, and the unemployment rates⁴ were 4.9% and 7.6%, respectively⁵. Since 1990, the Human Development Index (HDI)⁶ value for Poland has been steadily increasing. According to the most recent data, in 2015, in terms of its HDI value, Poland was ranked 36th out of 188 countries and territories covered, placing it in the group of countries with very high levels of human development. However, compared to 2010, its position in the HDI rank fell by 3 in 2015. Among EU countries, and especially from the CEE region, Poland overtook Slovakia and Hungary, but it was lower than the Czech Republic (ranked 28th)⁷.

Since 1999, when the administrative reform was introduced, Poland has been divided into voivodships – also referred to as ‘provinces’ or ‘regions’ in English (pol. *województwa*), then into poviats (pol. *powiaty*) and finally, into communes (pol. *gminy*). As of 2018, Poland’s territory covers 16 voivodships, 314 poviats and 2,478 communes, including 66 cities. The largest voivodship is the Mazovian one, where the capital city – Warsaw – is located. There were approximately 5.4 million people living in the Mazovian region in 2017, which accounted for 14% of the total population of the country. Warsaw was inhabited by 1.8 million persons⁸. In April 2018, the registered unemployment rate⁹ was 5.4% for the region and only 1.9% for the capital city¹⁰.

⁴ According to Eurostat, the unemployment rate represents unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. The labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who were: i) without work during the reference week, ii) currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment before the end of the two weeks following the reference week, iii) actively seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the four weeks period ending with the reference week to seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a job to start later, i.e. within a period of, at most, three months. The indicator is based on the EU Labour Force Survey.

⁵ Eurostat Database (2018a). *Employment rate by sex (tesem010)*. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tesem010&plugin=1> (last visit: 24.06.2018); Eurostat Database (2018b). *Unemployment rate by sex (tesem120)*. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tesem120&plugin=1> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁶ The Human Development Index is a synthetic measure that allows constant monitoring and assessment of the progress made in different countries in the three areas of human life that directly contribute to increasing human capabilities, i.e. a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. The calculation methodology was changed in 2010.

⁷ United Nations Development Program (2016). *Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone*. New York: UNDP, p. 198, 202.

⁸ Central Statistical Office of Poland (2017). *Area and population in the territorial profile in 2017*. Warsaw: Central Statistical Office of Poland, p. 17, 22.

⁹ It is defined by the Central Statistical Office of Poland as: “Share of registered unemployed persons to the economically active civilian population, i.e. excluding employees of budgetary entities conducting activity within the scope of national defence and public safety”, and it differs to some extent from the unemployment rate defined for the needs of the Labour Force Survey, Population and Housing Census 2002 and National Census of Population and Housing 2011. See more: Central Statistical Office of Poland (2018). *Terms used in official statistics*. Available at: <http://stat.gov.pl/en/metainformations/glossary/terms-used-in-official-statistics/486,term.html> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, Poland experienced a multidimensional transformation from a centrally planned to a free market economy and a shift from authoritarianism to democracy. The basic rules regarding the functioning of Poland as a republic have been included in the Chapter I of *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997*¹¹. Article 2 stipulates that: “The Republic of Poland shall be a democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principles of social justice”. Poland is a unitary state (article 3), and “supreme power in the Republic of Poland shall be vested in the Nation” (article 4(1)). Moreover, it is worth recalling the following articles from the Constitution: “Article 8:

1. The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic of Poland.
2. The provisions of the Constitution shall apply directly, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.

(...) Article 10

1. The system of government of the Republic of Poland shall be based on the separation of and balance between the legislative, executive and judicial powers.
2. Legislative power shall be vested in the Sejm and the Senate, executive power shall be vested in the President of the Republic of Poland and the Council of Ministers, and the judicial power shall be vested in courts and tribunals”.

In late 2015, the Law and Justice party (pol. *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*) came to power in Poland, and a new government was formed. Since that time, the ruling party – that can be described as a nationalist, populist and socially conservative party¹² – has led to a political situation which, both in Poland and abroad, is often described as a constitutional and judiciary crisis¹³, as some basic rules stipulated in the Constitution, including those above-mentioned, are not fully respected by the politicians and decision-makers. In this way, the ongoing political developments in Poland constitute serious threats not only to the independence of its judiciary system, but also to the rule of law itself and democracy. Consequences of this political line of the new government can be observed in the area of member states’ responsibilities towards admitting refugees within the EU relocation mechanism, authorities’

¹⁰ Central Statistical Office of Poland (2018). *Województwo*. Available at: <http://warszawa.stat.gov.pl/wojewodztwo/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

¹¹ Journal of Laws from 1997, No. 78, item 483, with amendments.

¹² See more: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (2014). *Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014*. Warszawa: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. Available at: <http://old.pis.org.pl/dokumenty.php?s=partia&idoc=164> (last visit: 24.06.2018); Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (2016). *Status Prawa i Sprawiedliwości*. Warszawa: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, p. 4. Available at: <http://pis.org.pl/dokumenty> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

¹³ See e.g.: Kustra, A. (2016). Poland’s constitutional crisis. From court-packing agenda to denial of Constitutional Court’s judgments. *Toruńskie Studia Polsko-Włoskie XII — Studi Polacco-Italiani Di Toruń XII*, 12, pp. 343-366. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/TSP-W.2016.022>.

acquiescence towards rising xenophobia, as well as in limiting funding for integration initiatives (e.g. for NGOs). Despite this situation, the role of NGOs remains important and there are significant local governmental, non-governmental and informal integration initiatives devoted to foreigners.

Migration and refugee situation and measures taken by the government, NGOs and other organizations

Poland's migration policy – recent developments

Recent migration policy of Poland should be described in terms of change partially resulting from the European asylum/migration crisis but mainly from the internal political developments. The strategy document approved in 2012 (introducing among others integration measures for all categories of immigrants), was invalidated in October 2016 by the new government and it has been officially justified by the fact that the migration situation in Europe (the migration crisis) and Poland (the unprecedented influx of Ukrainian migrants in recent years) has changed dramatically. As a consequence, as of mid-2018, there is no official political document on migration related issues available in Poland. However, in 2018, the Council of Ministers adopted a new strategic policy document “Socio-economic priorities of migration policy”. According to it, the new migration policy should be adapted to the priorities of the labour market, concentrate on supplementing labour resources with foreigners in sectors and/or occupations characterized by competency gaps (including protection of the national labour market) and respond to the needs of foreigners and Polish citizens living abroad. This includes repatriates, so as to encourage them to return to the country and establish or transfer their business activities there. It also ought to prevent further emigration and ensure an increase in return migration¹⁴.

Analysis of legal actions taken on the side of Polish parliament and government in recent years leads to a conclusion that the current national approach to migration is based on three key elements:

1. An opposition towards inflow of immigrants from culturally distant countries, especially from Muslim countries, and hence the lack of agreement on the involvement of Poland in the EU

¹⁴ Ministry of Investment and Development (2018). *Nowe priorytety rządowej polityki migracyjnej*. 29 March 2018. Available at: <https://www.mii.gov.pl/strony/aktualnosci/nowe-priorytety-rzadowej-polityki-migracyjnej/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

- relocation and resettlement schemes proposed under “The European Agenda on Migration” of 2015¹⁵ (with security concerns as an officially presented argument).
2. An open policy regarding labour migration from culturally close countries, particularly from Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries (mainly driven by the needs of the Polish labour market) but with growing emphasis on regulation and control of labour flows from outside of the EU.
 3. An open and welcoming policy regarding persons of Polish descent that aims to facilitate the resettlement of foreigners of Polish origin in Poland (presented in terms of moral obligation towards countrymen from the East).

Considering the very scope of the project “Atlas of Transitions”¹⁶, the points 1 and 2 are of critical importance. Contrary to previously expressed position (by the Polish government) in 2016 the Sejm (lower house of the Polish parliament) passed three resolutions expressing opposition to forced relocation of refugees from other EU countries. In practical terms no single relocated asylum seeker has been accepted from Italy and Greece (even if there is a steady flow of asylum seekers to Poland, mainly from Chechnya and Ukraine – see data of the Office for Foreigners¹⁷). This stance is clearly related (and reinforcing each other) to the fact that the vast majority of Poles (75%, according to the Polish Centre for Public Opinion Research [CBOS] survey, conducted in October 2017¹⁸) are against receiving refugees from Italy and Greece coming from the Middle East and North Africa within the relocation system. They would not change their mind even if Poland were to lose the EU funds for refusing to accept refugees from Muslim countries (74%)¹⁹. At the same time, however, more than half of Poles (61%) would accept refugees from the war zones in Eastern Ukraine.

On the other hand, admission of labour migrants to Poland remains highly liberal (the same refers to foreign students who, among others, can enjoy relatively easy access to the labour market during and after completion of their studies). This is part of a broader picture commonly ascribed to Poland as a country relatively liberal with regard to entry of foreigners, but restrictive in relation to their

¹⁵ See e.g.: Pachocka, M., Misiuna, J. (2017). La Pologne en Europe au début du XXIème siècle: à la croisée des chemins. *Hérodote*, 164 (1), pp. 145–161; Pachocka, M. (2016). Understanding the Visegrad Group states’ response to the migrant and refugee crises 2014+ in the European Union. *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, 19, pp. 101-132.

¹⁶ See more: Atlas of transitions. Available at: <http://www.atlasoftransitions.eu/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

¹⁷ Office for Foreigners. Available at: <https://udsc.gov.pl/en/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

¹⁸ Centre for Public Opinion Research (2017b). *Stosunek do przyjmowania uchodźców. Komunikat z badań*. December 2017, 163. Available at: https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_163_17.PDF (last visit: 24.06.2018).

¹⁹ See more: Górak-Sosnowska, K., Pachocka, M. (2018/2019). *Islamophobia and the quest for European identity. The case of Poland*. In: Zempi, I., Awan, I. (eds.). *The Routledge Handbook: Key Readings in Islamophobia*. London: Routledge (forthcoming).

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

settlement²⁰. This remark refers particularly to the so-called simplified procedure that came into force in 2007. The procedure is simplified because it allows (or used to allow as it has been substantially modified in 2018) to obtain visas with the right to work in Poland (i.e. starting a job without a valid work permit or a labour market test²¹ is possible) and to spent total of six months within one year in Poland. In practical terms the procedure has been extremely fast, simple and free of charge as it was based only on the employers' declarations of intent to hire a foreigner (to be registered with Polish local labour administration). As it will be explained later, the simplified procedure became the main channel of migrants' inflow to Poland, especially from Ukraine. Consequently, Ukraine has become the unquestionably major supplier of a foreign labour to Poland.

As noted above, regulations regarding short-term and seasonal employment in Poland have changed recently (starting from January 2018 but transitory regulations allowing for reference to the previously valid scheme are in force till the end of 2018). Along with the implementation of the *Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers*²² seasonal work permits have been introduced in Poland, and these are meant to be issued for a period of up to nine months during a calendar year, particularly in three sectors of the economy, i.e.: agriculture, horticulture and tourism. These permits will be available to foreigners from all third countries (from outside the EU), but in the case of nationals of six Eastern European and South Caucasian countries (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) they will be granted without conducting the labour market test. Nonetheless, employers' declarations of the intent to hire a foreigner – as discussed above – can be still issued but since January 2018 to citizens of the six aforementioned countries for up to six months during twelve months, without the labour market test, in all sectors of the economy except those that are regulated by provisions regarding seasonal work permits. From policy point of view, it is important to acknowledge three important changes in the amendment:

1. According to the recent regulations employers are required to register not only declarations but also foreigners themselves (i.e. the fact of (not) taking up employment by foreigners on the basis of the registered declarations).

²⁰ Importantly this refers to foreign students as they are allowed to work in Poland during their studies and to seek employment after completion of their education in Poland.

²¹ Labor market test implies that an employer is expected to make an attempt to fill the vacancy on the domestic market before recruiting a foreigner (in practice it means that the vacancy needs to be publicly announced for a certain time).

²² OJ L 94, 28.3.2014.

2. There is a possibility to limit the employment of foreigners by determining the maximum number of work permits, seasonal work permits and employers' declarations on employment of foreigners in a given year.
3. There is also an option to introduce limits (quotas) for specific voivodships (regions), professions, types of employment contracts concluded with foreigners and types of entities hiring foreigners (and this is – politically – potentially the most substantial change).

The practical outcomes of recently introduced changes are still unknown. With regard to the relocation scheme, the stance of Polish government is rigorous. Until the end of the EU emergency relocation mechanism (September 2017), Poland – similarly as Hungary – did not accept any foreigner within its framework²³. This approach is officially explained by the fact that the preference is to deal with the migration crisis 'out of the EU', i.e. to help people in need of international protection, asylum seekers and refugees – or broadly understood forced migrants – outside the EU territory and providing support to border guards from those EU countries that are under strong migration pressure. The official rhetoric also points to security (especially after terrorist attacks in Brussels in March 2016 and Nice in July 2017 and commonly evoked problems with identification of asylum seekers), economic and humanitarian concerns (e.g. it is claimed that it prevents human smuggling). In the opinion of the Polish officials, all the EU countries should provide refugees with support near their homelands rather than on the territory of the EU (which encourages subsequent waves of immigration)²⁴.

This tough political position towards persons seeking protection is accompanied with more and more discretionary policy towards immigrants residing in Poland and particularly towards integration issues. Recently, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration has limited the access of non-governmental organizations supporting the immigrant integration to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). Now they can apply for the AMIF funds only to regional authorities if they announce calls for institutional partners to implement integration projects. This is a very important issue as previously the European funds were the main source of financing for NGOs – the main actors dealing with

²³ Although the previous government agreed to resettle to Poland over 7,000 asylum seekers from Italy, Greece and non-EU countries located in the war-affected areas.

²⁴ In November 2016, the Ministers of the Interior of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia) issued a joint statement concerning the migration crisis, in which they propose alternative ways of dealing with this problem at the regional and EU level. See more: Visegrad Group (2016). *Joint Statement of V4 Interior Ministers on the Establishment of the Migration Crisis Response Mechanism*. 21 November 2016. Available at: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-of-sv4> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

immigrant integration in Poland²⁵. As a consequence, the scale and intensity of integration activities largely depends on the local and regional authorities (and activity of NGOs).

Poland as an emigration-immigration country

Poland is by all means a traditional emigration country with massive outflows of people dating back to mid-19th century. Nonetheless there are two turning points commonly discussed with regard to the recent migration from Poland (and other countries of the region).

First, the beginning of the socio-economic transition in the Central and Eastern European countries brought a significant increase in concerns of policy makers considering possible migration flows from this part of Europe (and predominantly driven by basic comparisons of wage/income differentials²⁶). Interestingly, these concerns were never realized in reality and apparently very large migration potential in Poland never translated into massive migration to the West. It does not mean that mobility remained low: due to both factors of political nature (migration policy of Western European countries which have gradually undertaken steps towards tightening their admission and settlement policies) and economic conditions (costs-benefits analysis) relatively limited scale of registered long-term migration has been complemented with far more massive short-term or even circulatory mobility as Central and Eastern Europeans were granted not only the right to leave but also to return and that opened the way for short-term migration strategies²⁷.

Second, the EU-enlargement from May 2004 meant a substantial change in terms of both rules governing mobility and migration realities. This shift was not universal and gradual (in fact, only three countries – the UK, Ireland and Sweden – opened their labour markets from day one, in case of Austria and Germany transitory restrictions were kept in force till 2011) but still it impacted the scale and structure of migration from Poland in an unprecedented way. In the first post-accession years, the stock of Polish migrants abroad jumped from around 786,000 in 2002 to 1 million in 2004 and 2.3

²⁵ More about the problems of NGOs supporting immigrant integration related to their difficult financial situation: Klaus, W., Ostaszewska-Zuk, E., Szczepanik, M. (2017). *The role of European Funds in supporting the integration of migrants in Poland*. Warsaw: Association for Legal Intervention. Available at: https://interwencjaprawna.pl/en/files/Po-FAMI-raport_ENG.pdf (last visit: 24.06.2018).

²⁶ See e.g. Layard, R., Blanchard, O., Dornbusch, R., Krugman, P. (1992). *East-West Migration. The Alternatives*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

²⁷ Kaczmarczyk, P. (2005). *Migracje zarobkowe Polaków w dobie przemian*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

million in 2007 – the 2007 figure was equivalent to 6.6% of the country’s population that year. The number of Polish migrants temporarily abroad slightly declined during the global financial crisis but picked up again recently, mainly due to increasing flows to Germany (after relaxation of transitory restrictions in terms of labour market access) to reach 2.3 million in 2014 and even 2.5 million in 2016²⁸. The EU enlargement resulted in substantial changes in the area of Polish mobility. First, post-2004 migration flows are far more numerous than ever before and target relatively “new” destinations (the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands). Second, even if most of the migrants leave Poland with an intention to become a temporary migrant only, there is a clear evolution of their plans visible. The most recent data demonstrate that in case of most destinations there is a tendency to prolong stay abroad and, in growing scale, to settle. Third, recent, i.e. post-2004 Polish migrants are different than their pre-accession counterparts. In general, post-enlargement migration is far more diversified than before and more egalitarian in terms of Polish regions involved. Migrants are relatively younger and better educated, coming mainly from small or medium-size towns. They are no longer “losers of transition” interested in imposing “survival strategies” dedicated to the well-being of their families. They are more and more oriented towards their self-sufficiency and trying to find better and more satisfactory jobs abroad²⁹.

All statistical data available as well as scientific research point to the facts that: 1. Scale of immigration to Poland is low or very low and 2. Considering continuously large scale of emigration, Poland is only starting to become an immigration country³⁰. This is particularly well visible when comparing Poland to other OECD countries (Figure 1): as for 2013 the share of foreign-born in the total population of Poland was among the lowest when compared to other relatively well-developed countries, importantly, it was not only lower than observed in case of traditional immigration countries (Australia), EU-15 countries (Austria, Germany, Ireland) but also substantially lower than in the case of other countries from the CEE region (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia).

²⁸ See more: Central Statistical Office of Poland. (2017). *Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach emigracji z Polski w latach 2004–2016*. Warsaw: Central Statistical Office of Poland. Available at: <http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/migracje-zagraniczne-ludnosci/informacja-o-rozmiarach-i-kierunkach-emigracji-z-polski-w-latach-20042016,2,10.html> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

²⁹ See more: Grabowska, I., Okólski, M. (2009). *Emigracja ostatnia?* Warsaw: Scholar; Kaczmarczyk, P. (ed.) (2011). *Mobilność i migracje w dobie transformacji – wyzwania metodologiczne*. Warsaw: Scholar; Janicka A., Kaczmarczyk, P. (2016). Mobilities in the crisis and post-crisis times: migration strategies of Poles on the EU labour market. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 42(10), pp. 1693-1710. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1162350> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

³⁰ Okólski, M. (ed.) (2012). *European Immigrations: Trends, Structures and Policy Implications*. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.

Atlas of Transitions


New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)



Co-funded by the
Creative Europe Programme
of the European Union

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

Figure 1 The foreign-born as % of the total population, Poland and selected OECD countries, 2000 and 2013




Source: OECD (2015). *International Migration Outlook 2015*. Paris: OECD.

Similarly, share of foreign-born in the labour force remains extremely low in Poland. Figure 2 demonstrates that Poland and other CEE countries participate in the global labour market, but primarily in terms of emigration of their citizens.

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

Figure 2 Share of foreign-born in total employment, Poland and selected OECD countries, 2007, 2011 and 2014



Source: OECD (2015). *International Migration Outlook 2015*. Paris: OECD.

Figures 1 and 2 clearly depict the immigration situation of Poland in the pre-2014 period that can be generally described in terms of very low settlement forms of inflow and dynamically growing temporary, seasonal or circular mobility. Until recently, immigration to Poland could be characterized in several main points that are as follows³¹:

1. The main characteristic of inflows to Poland was that they were limited in quantitative terms. Data from the 2011 National Census of Population and Housing (NSP 2011) indicated that in Poland there were barely 55,400 foreigners counted as part of the so-called *de facto* population, meaning people registered as living permanently in the country. According to Eurostat data, as of 1 January 2015 about 110,000 resident foreigners were in Poland, constituting about 0.3% of the total resident population, leaving Poland in last place among the EU countries.

³¹ This section relies heavily on the paper: Górný A., Kaczmarczyk, P. (2018). A known but uncertain path: The role of foreign labour in Polish agriculture. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 11 January 2018. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.12.015> (last visit: 24.06.2018), and is based on data from the Central Statistical Office of Poland, the Office for Foreigners, the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

2. The inflow of immigrants to Poland (third country nationals, citizens of non-EU countries) is limited to just a few groups of nationalities, clearly dominated by the countries of the former USSR (Ukraine, Belarus) and selected Asian countries (Vietnam, China). This structure is largely a consequence of historical processes (e.g. the relationship of Poland's communist authorities with Vietnam), but it also indicates that with Poland's relatively low attractiveness as a destination country; the decisive role has been played by well-developed networks of connections among migrants. The predominance of immigrants from Ukraine is clear as they account for from 30% to almost 100% of all immigrants, depending on the category taken into consideration (residency, and related to the job market).
3. Immigration to Poland is largely temporary or of circulatory nature, in particular this is the case of immigrants from the former USSR. This is a result of the legal regulations (relatively liberal in terms of entry and taking up work, while much more restrictive in relation to questions of settling), but it is also quite typical for migration movements in Central and Eastern Europe³².
4. Another important feature of immigration to Poland is that the dominant group of foreigners in Poland is economic / labour migrants – settlement of foreigners in Poland remains limited in scope and is motivated primarily by family concerns (mainly mixed marriages).
5. Relatively large share of foreigners residing in Poland represent undocumented immigrants (with regard to stay or work). This feature is to be linked to regulations (as discussed above) that make it relatively easy to enter the country, and even to acquire a document providing work authorization (particularly in the simplified system) but leave a relatively broad area of possible illegality or semi-legality with regard to economic activities undertaken in Poland.
6. Inflow of asylum seekers, and particularly the number of persons with a refugee status, remains (very) low. In practical terms it includes predominantly persons originating from Chechnya (i.e. Russian citizens) with only limited prospects to obtain the status (see Table 1).
7. The scale of acquisition of Polish citizenship is low as well. Since early 2000s the number of persons granted Polish citizenship was as high as 1–2.5 thousand annually to increase slightly to above 4 thousand since 2013 (according to the Office of Foreigners data³³).
8. Until recently immigrants to Poland were concentrated in just a few selected regions and even locations, with Warsaw and the surrounding Mazowieckie province as key migration destination.

³² Górný, A., Grabowska-Lusińska, I., Lesińska, M., Okólski, M. (eds) (2010). *Immigration to Poland: Policy, Employment, Integration*. Warsaw, Scholar.

³³ Based on statistics provided by the Office for Foreigners, see more: Office for Foreigners. Available at: <https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/zestawienia-roczne/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

It is obvious that this is conditioned by local attributes and regional labour markets, and the structure of the economy – e.g. the significance of the services sector, including trade³⁴.

Table 1 Asylum seekers by nationality and type of asylum status (top 5 nationalities) in Poland, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016

Year	No	Refugee status (according to the Geneva convention)		Subsidiary protection		Tolerated stay		Negative decision		No decision	
		Nationality	Total	Nationality	Total	Nationality	Total	Nationality	Total	Nationality	Total
2010		TOTAL	84	TOTAL	229	TOTAL	210	TOTAL	3967	TOTAL	6513
		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>	
	1	Russia	43	Russia	203	Russia	103	Russia	2594	Russia	4986
	2	Belarus	19	Iraq	6	Armenia	19	Georgia	987	Georgia	1159
	3	Iraq	5	Afghanistan	5	Georgia	14	Armenia	74	Armenia	45
	4	Afghanistan	4	Kazakhstan	2	Belarus	10	Bangladesh	26	Kyrgyzstan	32
	5	Iran	2	Cuba	1	Sudan	8	Pakistan	22	Belarus	23
2012		TOTAL	106	TOTAL	164	TOTAL	319	TOTAL	1960	TOTAL	8753
		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>	
	1	Russia	65	Russia	142	Russia	242	Russia	1098	Russia	5050
	2	Belarus	25	Syria	6	Georgia	23	Georgia	468	Georgia	2933
	3	Turkmenistan	6	Afghanistan	4	Armenia	21	Armenia	111	Armenia	320
	4	China	3	Belarus	4	Belarus	5	Ukraine	48	Egypt	68
	5	Afghanistan	1	Kyrgyzstan	2	Stateless	3	Vietnam	50	Kazakhstan	43
2014		TOTAL	267	TOTAL	181	TOTAL	302	TOTAL	1 132	TOTAL	5 660
		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>	
	1	Syria	115	Russia	118	Russia	202	Russia	1 002	Russia	3 893
	2	Afghanistan	27	Syria	17	Georgia	44	Ukraine	645	Georgia	677

³⁴ Górný, A., Grabowska-Lusińska, I., Lesińska, M., Okólski, M. (eds) (2010), op.cit.

	3	Kazakhstan	22	Iraq	15	Armenia	13	Georgia	133	Ukraine	385
	4	Stateless	22	Kazakhstan	11	Ukraine	11	Vietnam	43	Armenia	122
	5	Belarus	14	Ukraine	6	Afghanistan	7	Armenia	30	Tajikistan	81
		TOTAL	108	TOTAL	150	TOTAL	49	TOTAL	2 188	TOTAL	9 502
		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>		<i>of which:</i>	
2016	1	Syria	40	Russia	57	Russia	35	Russia	1 125	Russia	7 701
	2	Ukraine	16	Ukraine	51	Armenia	5	Armenia	696	Tajikistan	649
	3	Russia	10	Iraq	15	Belarus	3	Belarus	109	Ukraine	434
	4	Turkmenistan	9	Tajikistan	7	Egypt	2	Egypt	51	Armenia	296
	5	Tajikistan	6	Libya	4	Pakistan	1	Pakistan	36	Georgia	99

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on: Office for Foreigners' data.

Importantly, the picture sketched above is increasingly less accurate with time as the changes with regard to immigration to Poland recently became extremely dynamic. The available statistical data show that in 2002–2011 there was 3.5-fold growth in the number of immigrants from Ukraine registered as permanently resident in Poland. This process continued in the following years and gained additional dynamics after the outbreak of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. The number of Ukrainian citizens who received permanent residence permits in 2014 was two times higher than in 2010, and in 2015 more than four times higher; a similar growth rate marked temporary residence permits; very high growth was noted in the number of people seeking international protection: from fewer than 50 people to more than 2,300 (see also Table 1). Additionally, in 2010–2015 a more than 500% increase was noted in the number of students from Ukraine registered in the Polish higher education system. As a result, available register data indicate that at the end of 2016 about 266,000 people had valid residence permits in Poland (about half of which were documents for temporary stay), and more than 103,000 of them were held by Ukrainians (four times the number held by the second-place group (Germans) and 10 times that of other non-EU countries (Belarus, Vietnam, China).


Moreover, developments in terms of labour migration are of particular importance. This is shown, first, by data on work permits with a growth rate of 50% over the period 2010–2015 (from 44,000 a year to almost 66,000), but in the case of Ukrainians the growth was much faster, reaching 284% (92% in 2015 alone). In 2016 more than 120,000 work permits were registered, about 87% of which

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

went to Ukrainians. Apart from this an enormous number of documents within the simplified procedure described above have been registered. Figure 3 shows the scale and the increase in the number of registered declarations. While in the initial stage during which the procedure functioned (until 2008) it was relatively insignificant, after 2010 the number of documents significantly exceeded 200,000 each year, approaching 400,000 in 2014 and 800,000 in 2015, and exceeding 1.3 million in 2016. Around 1.8 million of declarations have been registered in 2017 with the vast majority of the declarations (80-90% or more) going to citizens of Ukraine.

Figure 3 Number and dynamics of registered declarations within the simplified procedure in Poland, 2007-2018



Source: Górný, A., Kaczmarczyk, P. (2018). A known but uncertain path: The role of foreign labour in Polish agriculture. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 11 January 2018. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.12.015> (last visit: 24.06.2018), p. 35.


It is important to acknowledge that the number given above does not equal the number of immigrants residing in Poland as the statistical data on simplified procedure applies only to registered

declarations, not to employment. According to available estimates around 60-70% of registered declarations are used. Additionally, in this case we are dealing with work that is primarily seasonal, which means that in attempting to describe the effects of the inflow of immigrants from Ukraine (and other countries) on the Polish labour market, we would need to take into account average employment over the course of an entire year. Notwithstanding, due to rapid development of the simplified procedure Poland became a European leader as far as seasonal work permits/visas are concerned³⁵. In fact, as a consequence of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine with Russian involvement initiated in 2013, migration from Ukraine to Poland increased to such a high volume, relative to other national groups, that nowadays one can talk about “ukrainisation” of migration to Poland, and this is particularly well established with respect to labour migration.

Rapid development of the seasonal immigration to Poland has two additional features that are critically important in the context of the “Atlas of transitions” project. First, from the moment the simplified system started operating, there has been a clear predominance of declarations registered in Mazowieckie province (see Figure 4). This confirms the general knowledge on the subject of migration in Poland, but the dominance of this province over others was for a long time overwhelming. Still, interestingly in the past two years the process has begun of Ukrainian immigration “spilling over” across the territory of Poland: Mazowieckie province is still the most important destination, but there has been a clear increase in the number of provinces where at least 50,000 declarations have been registered and this doubtlessly indicates that immigration becomes more and more common in Poland. Second, the sectoral structure is also changing. The primary reason to introduce the simplified procedure was to ensure labour supply in the agricultural sector, and in essence, this sector still has relatively high significance: it accounts for from 30% to 60% of the total number of registered documents. But starting from the peak year of 2009, the importance of agriculture in the simplified procedure has been systematically decreasing, and additionally the sectoral structure is increasingly diversifying (see Figure 5). Since the introduction of the simplified procedure construction plays very significant role, the share of industry and trade is also growing, and additionally – particularly in 2015-2016 – the activity of intermediaries has been increasing, which additionally influences and will continue to influence the variety of jobs undertaken by immigrants, first and foremost from Ukraine (in 2016 they accounted for 96% of all registered declarations).

³⁵ By comparison, as of mid-2016, the number of migrants with residence permits in Poland equaled only 225 thousand persons whereas one third of this stock was composed of Ukrainian nationals.

Figure 4 Registered declarations by province in Poland (2007-2016)




Source: Górny A., Kaczmarczyk, P. (2018). A known but uncertain path: The role of foreign labour in Polish agriculture. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 11 January 2018. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.12.015> (last visit: 24.06.2018), p. 38.

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

Figure 5 Registered declarations by sector in Poland (2007-2016)



Source: Górny, A., Kaczmarczyk, P. (2018). A known but uncertain path: The role of foreign labour in Polish agriculture. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 11 January 2018. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.12.015> (last visit: 24.06.2018), p. 38.

As we are assessing an immigration process “in the making”, it would be extremely difficult to formulate clear and straightforward conclusions. Nonetheless it is important to note that due to the inflow of seasonal/temporary foreign labour Poland – completely unexpectedly – has become a European leader in terms of import of foreign labour. Moreover, the process is not only about the growing significance of foreign workers on the Polish labour market, but also about its continuous expansion in terms of sectoral and spatial composition (with clear signals of a “spillover” of migration both in terms of sectors and geographically and the increasing presence of immigrants even in small towns and rural areas). Finally, even if today the stay of those workers is perceived mainly through seasonal/temporary lens, it is clear that some part of them will decide to extend their stay and even to settle in Poland. This final remark may be of key significance in the context of how the situation develops, as Poland (still) has not worked out mechanisms and tools to integrate migrants.

The migration and asylum legislative framework

The migration and asylum legislative framework adopted in Poland after 1989 encompasses both primary and secondary laws. The main legal acts regulating directly or indirectly the situation of foreigners in Poland include i.a.³⁶:

1. *Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997*³⁷,
2. *Act of 12 December 2013 on foreigners*³⁸,
3. *Act of 13 June 2003 on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Poland*³⁹,
4. *Act of 14 July 2006 on the terms and conditions of the entry into and the stay in the territory of the Republic of Poland of the citizens of the EU Member States and the members of their families*⁴⁰,
5. *Act of 20 April 2004 on the promotion of employment and labour market institutions*⁴¹,
6. *Act of 15 June 2012 on regulating the results of employing third-country nationals staying in Poland illegally*⁴²,
7. *Act of 9 November 2000 on repatriation*⁴³,
8. *Act of 7 September 2007 on the Pole's card*⁴⁴,
9. *Act of 2 April 2009 on Polish Citizenship*⁴⁵,
10. *Act of 27 July 2005 Law on higher education*⁴⁶,
11. *Act of 2 July 2004 on freedom of economic activity*⁴⁷/ *Act of 6 March 2018 Entrepreneurs Law*⁴⁸,
12. *Act of 7 September 1991 on the system of education*⁴⁹,
13. *Act of 27 August 2004 on health care benefits financed from public funds*⁵⁰,

³⁶ See more e.g.: European Migration Network (2018). *The main legal acts regulating the situation of foreigners in Poland*. Available at: <https://www.emn.gov.pl/ese/legislation/polish-legal-acts/8783/The-main-legal-acts-regulating-the-situation-of-foreigners-in-Poland.html> (last visit: 24.06.2018); Sejm (2018). *Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych*. Available at: <http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

³⁷Journal of Laws from 1997, No. 78, item 483, with amendments.

³⁸Journal of Laws from 2013, item 1650, with amendments.

³⁹Journal of Laws from 2003, No. 128, item 1176, with amendments.

⁴⁰Journal of Laws from 2006, No. 144, item 1043, with amendments.

⁴¹Journal of Laws from 2004, No. 99, item 1001, with amendments.

⁴²Journal of Laws from 2012, item 769.

⁴³Journal of Laws from 2000, No. 106, item 1118, with amendments.

⁴⁴Journal of Laws from 2007, No. 180, item 1280, with amendments.

⁴⁵Journal of Laws from 2012, item 161, with amendments.

⁴⁶Journal of Laws from 2005, No. 164, item 1365, with amendments.

⁴⁷Journal of Laws from 2004, No. 173, item 1807. Repealed in April 2018.

⁴⁸Journal of Laws from 2018, No. item 646.

⁴⁹Journal of Laws from 1991, No. 95, item 425, with amendments.

⁵⁰Journal of Laws from 2004, No. 210, item 2135, with amendments.

14. *Act of 12 March 2004 on social assistance*⁵¹.

There are some provisions of the Constitution that can be referred to foreigners and their situation in Poland. While article 37 states in its para. 1: “Anyone, being under the authority of the Polish State, shall enjoy the freedoms and rights ensured by the Constitution”, only its para. 2 underlines explicitly to foreigners that: “Exemptions from this principle with respect to foreigners shall be specified by statute”. Paragraph 1 of the article 56 stipulates that: “Foreigners shall have the right of asylum in the Republic of Poland in accordance with principles specified by statute”, and is followed by the paragraph 2 stating that: “Foreigners who seek protection from persecution in the Republic of Poland, may be granted the status of a refugee in accordance with international agreements to which the Republic of Poland is a party”. This article applies only to foreigners who need a national or international form of protection in Poland. Other articles, the content of which may be referred to foreigners, are: 32, 40, 41, 47, 68 and 70. Apart from the Constitution, the two most important acts regulating the foreigners’ affairs are aforementioned acts from 2003 and 2013 which cover a wide range of migration and protection related issues in a detailed way.

One of the instruments of protection of migrants’ rights in Poland is also anti-discriminatory law. It is typified mainly by *The Labour Code*⁵² and *Act on the implementation of certain provisions of the European Union in the field of equal treatment*⁵³ (so called *Anti-discrimination Act*). Both of these acts prohibit discrimination based on several protected characteristics. With respect to migration the most relevant is prohibition against discrimination based on racial/ethnic origin and religion.

The Labour Code requires equal treatment of employees regardless of ethnic origin, race and religion i.a. in relation to establishing and terminating an employment relationship, employment conditions, promotion conditions, as well as access to training in order to improve professional qualifications. Equal treatment means that there is no discrimination based on the above-mentioned characteristics irrespective of employee’s nationality. It means that the protection as it is not limited to Polish citizens is granted also to migrants. The Polish Labour Code prohibits (art. 18^{3a} par. 3-6):

- direct discrimination, i.e. less favourable treatment of one employee because of his/her racial/ethnic origin or religion as compared to other employees;

⁵¹ Journal of Laws from 2004, No. 64, item 593, with amendments.

⁵² *Act of 26 June 1974 the Labour Code*, Journal of Laws from 1974, No. 24, item 141, with amendments.

⁵³ Journal of Laws from 2010, No. 245, item 1700, with amendments.

- indirect discrimination, which occurs if an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice places or would place all or a considerable number of employees belonging to a particular group distinguished on the grounds of racial/ethnic origin or religion at disadvantage, or at a particular disadvantage in relation to employment the establishment and termination of an employment relationship and its conditions unless it is objectively justified;
- encouragement or order to discriminate against employee because of his/her racial/ethnic origin and/or religion;
- harassment and sexual harassment based on racial/ethnic origin and/or religion of an employee.

If the employer is unable to justify differentiation of treatment (such as terminating or rejecting the establishment of an employment relationship, rejection to participate in training organized to improve professional qualifications or unequal remuneration for equal work) based on the protected characteristics with objective reasons, it will be qualified as a violation of the principle of equality in employment. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions to prohibition of discrimination in accordance to which different treatment based on racial/ethnic origin and/or religion will be lawful (art. 18^{3b} par. 2-4), and they are as follows:

- situation in which the type of work or the conditions of its performance implies that racial/ethnic origin or religion constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement for the employee;
- situation where churches and other religious societies, as well as organizations the ethics of which is based on religion, creed or world-view deter access to employment on the grounds of religion, creed or world-view provided the type or characteristics of the activity conducted by the churches and other religious societies, as well as organisations causes that the religion, creed or world-view are a real and decisive occupational requirement for the employee, proportional to reaching a lawful aim of the differentiation of the situation of such a person;
- actions undertaken for a certain period of time, aimed at creating equal opportunities for all or a considerable number of employees distinguished by their racial/ethnic origin and religion by reducing the actual inequalities for an advantage of such.

A person (a Polish citizen or a foreigner) against whom an employer has violated the principle of equal treatment in employment has the right to compensation of at least the amount of the minimum remuneration for work (art. 18^{3d}).

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

The mechanism of protection against discrimination that can be under *The Anti-discrimination Act* resembles this under *The Labour Code* (when it comes to types of prohibited discrimination, shifting burden of proof or financial responsibility of the perpetrator). When it comes to the personal scope of application, it covers i.a. race, ethnic origin and nationality as well as religion. They constitute protected characteristics with respect to:

- the access to and conditions of use of social security, services, including residential services, objects and procurement of rights and energy, provided they are offered publicly (race, ethnic origin or nationality) (art. 6);
- medical care and education and higher education (race, ethnic origin or nationality) (art. 7);
- professional education, including continuation of education, improvement, change of profession and professional practices; conditions for taking and conducting business or professional activity, including, but not limited to the employment relationship or work under a civil-law contract; joining and acting in trade unions, employers' organizations and professional self-governing associations, and also exercising rights to which members of these organisations are entitled; access to and conditions of use of labour market instruments and labour market services, offered by labour market institutions and labour market instruments and labour market services offered by other entities acting for the employment, development of human resources and prevention of unemployment (race, ethnic origin, nationality, religion) (art. 8.1).

Interestingly, with respect to above-mentioned material scope of prohibition of discrimination, *The Anti-discriminatory Act* stipulates that “unequal treatment of, accordingly, legal persons and administrative units other than legal persons, to which legal capacity is assigned under the act, shall be prohibited, if violation of the principle of equal treatment occurs due to race, ethnic origin or nationality of the members thereof” (art. 10). The Act allows, however, unequal treatment due to religion in the scope of application of measures necessary in the democratic state for its public safety and order, protection of health or protection of freedom and rights of other persons and prevention of actions subject to penal sanctions (art. 8.2).

Main actors / stakeholders dealing with migration

As in other EU countries, the list of actors dealing with migration and protection/asylum in Poland is multi-level and diverse. It covers both state and non-state actors, including i.a. public administration on central and regional/local levels, representations/offices/agencies of the international organizations

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

and its institutions, non-governmental organizations and civil society. As of mid-2018, the key state actors include i.a.: the Ministry of Interior and Administration with two supervised bodies – the Office for Foreigners and the Border Guard, the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Investment and Development, the National Labour Inspectorate, the Central Statistical Office, the Refugee Board, 16 voivodes' offices and 16 voivodship administrative courts and the Supreme Administrative Court. Among main stakeholders active in the field of migration and asylum in Poland are also: IOM Country Office in Warsaw, UNHCR Office in Poland, and the headquarters of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The list of migrant-assisting NGOs is rather short, and the majority of them operate in big cities such as Warsaw, Cracow, Gdańsk and Lublin⁵⁴.

Migrants, depending on their residency status, have different access to institutional support in Poland (e.g. labour market, social services, education, legal assistance, etc.). The most privileged, but also most vulnerable group are beneficiaries of international protection, i.e. people granted a refugee status or a subsidiary protection in Poland. Only they have access to a special form of integration support in the country through the so-called individual integration programs (IIP). On the basis of *The Law of 12 March 2004 on social assistance*⁵⁵ and some executive acts, every foreigner who was granted international protection in Poland can apply for financial support for subsistence costs and study of Polish language and specialized social counselling provided by the municipal institutions called the Poviats Family Support Centres (pol. *Powiatowe Centra Pomocy Rodzinie*). Individual integration programs are financed from central budget but implemented by local institutions. Each IIP takes the form of a social written contract agreed by a refugee and a social worker, and it includes rights and obligations of both sides in most important areas of integration such as: labour, social aspects and culture. It takes into consideration individual situation and capabilities of a given foreigner, e.g. his/her level of education, work experience, family situation and language skills. IIP provides a refugee with a support of the social worker in everyday contacts with other institutions, NGOs or local community. At the same time a foreigner is expected to make efforts to integrate within the society and become independent (i.a. by learning Polish and actively looking for a job) as soon as possible. Those who do not respect rules agreed within the IIP contract (e.g. do not attend Polish classes or do

⁵⁴ See more about migrant-assisting organizations: IOM (2018). *Migrant.info.pl: Migrant-assisting organizations*. Available at: <http://www.migrant.info.pl/migrant-assisting-organizations.html> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁵⁵ Journal of Laws from 2004, No. 64, item 593, with amendments.

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

not look for a job without a serious reason) can lose a right to support provided in the integration program. The limited length of IIP (up to 12 months) and its effectiveness are often questioned.

That is why, e.g. in Warsaw, institutions responsible for providing integration programs⁵⁶ use different kinds of funding (European or municipal) to enrich their offer. Thanks to that foreigners with international protection living in Warsaw have access to different forms of integration support like vocational trainings, professional Polish courses or specialized social or psychological counselling besides typical support offered within the framework of IIP⁵⁷. Moreover, different Offices of the City Council provide different types of support to foreigners and promote multiculturalism and integration in their given fields (education, culture, social support etc.). Some of them only provide funds which could be used by NGOs (e.g. “small grants” program), and some realize their own projects in cooperation with various actors (e.g. Multicultural Center).

Unfortunately, integration policy is still not seen by many politicians as important and besides Poviats Family Support Centres no other institutions deal with integration of foreigners in Poland. Moreover, these institutions are responsible for providing support only to foreigners with international protection, so other foreigners have to rely on support provided by NGOs. Integration policy is seen as a responsibility of municipalities (who very often has no experience and wish to provide any additional support) and NGOs, and a main source of financing should be provided by European funds⁵⁸.

Attitudes and behaviours towards migrants and refugees

It is only the last few years that migration has appeared as a core topic of the public debate in Poland⁵⁹. In the context of migrant and refugee crisis (which happened in other EU countries, but did

⁵⁶ In Warsaw, an institution called the Warsaw Family Support Center, one of the units of the City Council, is responsible for providing integration support to forced migrants within the framework of IIP.

⁵⁷ Warszawskie Centrum Pomocy Rodzinie (2018). *Informacja o projekcie „Wsparcie-Aktywizacja-Włączenie (WAW)”*. Available at: <http://www.wcpr.pl/informacja-efs/> (last visit: 24.06.2018); Jończyk, J. (2016). *Porównanie projektów „Integracja dla samodzielności” i „Witamy w Warszawie” w zakresie działań podejmowanych na rzecz cudzoziemców*. Warszawa: Warszawskie Centrum Pomocy Rodzinie. Available at: http://ngo.um.warszawa.pl/sites/ngo2.um.warszawa.pl/files/zalaczniki/dokumenty/prezentacja_2016.pdf (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁵⁸ Babis, P. (2012). *Wpływ Unii Europejskiej na budowę polskiej polityki integracyjnej*. In: Bieniecki, M., Pawlak, M. (eds.). *Praktyki integracji. Doświadczenia i Perspektywy*. Warszawa: Caritas Polsk, pp. 131-131.

⁵⁹ Jura, J., Kałużyńska, K. (2015). *Obraz obcokrajowców i imigrantów w polskich mediach tradycyjnych i internetowych*. In: Konieczna-Salamatin, J. (ed.). *Imigranci o wysokich kwalifikacjach na polskim rynku pracy. Raport z badań 2014-2015*. Warszawa: Instytut Społeczno-Ekonomicznych Ekspertyz; Fundacja “Nasz Wybór”; Łodziński, S. (2017). *Uchodźcy jako „społeczność podejrzana” (suspect community). Polska opinia publiczna wobec udzielania pomocy uchodźcom w*

not directly affect Poland)⁶⁰, media and political discourse created a feeling of threat and panic, at least for some segments of the Polish society. At the time in particular islamophobia⁶¹ was generalized on everyone from Muslim countries⁶². As a result, refugees started to be perceived as suspects, or a group potentially threatening Poland's safety, culture and financial situation⁶³.

Public opinion

Periodical studies of the Polish Centre for Public Opinion Research show that since 2015, percentage of Poles who think that Poland should not receive refugees from countries affected by conflict has grown threefold (from 21% in May 2015 to 63% in October 2016)⁶⁴. In the same period, percentage of those open to letting refugees stay in Poland till they can return to their home country had fallen from 58% to 29%. Even in 2015, it was only 14% of respondents who would let refugees settle in Poland, and in 2017 this number was 4%⁶⁵. Results show also that Poles hold different attitudes towards different groups of migrants. Poles are much more open towards receiving refugees from eastern Ukraine (61% positive answers) than from the Middle East and Africa (20% positive answers). The vast majority of respondents were also of the opinion that Poland should not receive refugees from Muslim countries even if that would mean losing European funds⁶⁶.

May and August 2015 marked the precise moment when change in attitudes towards more negative sentiments occurred (see Figure 6). In this three months, percentage of respondents willing to admit refugees for some time to Poland fell by 16 percentage points (p.p.) (from 72% to 56%). At the same time percentage of those who thought that Poland should not be helping refugees rose by 17 p.p. (from 21% to 38%). This change of attitudes coincided with the migration and refugee crisis which was

okresie maj 2015-maj 2017. In: Górny, A., Grzymała-Moszczyńska, H., Klaus, W., Łodziński, S. (eds.). *Uchodźcy w Polsce. Sytuacja prawna, skala naphywu i integracja w społeczeństwie polskim oraz rekomendacje*. Warszawa: Polska Akademia Nauk. Available at: http://www.kbnm.pan.pl/images/KBnM_PAN_ekspertyza_Uchod%C5%BAcy_w_Polsce.pdf (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁶⁰ See more: Pachocka, M. (2016), op.cit.; Pachocka, M., Misiuna, J. (2017), op.cit.

⁶¹ See more: Pędziwiatr, K., (2017). *Islamophobia in Poland: National Report 2016*. In: Bayralki E., Hafez, F. (eds.). *European Islamophobia Report 2016*. Istanbul: SETA, pp. 411-443; Górak-Sosnowska, K., Pachocka, M. (2018/2019), op.cit.

⁶² Centre of Migration Research – University of Warsaw (2015). *Kryzys i co dalej. Biuletyn Migracyjny*, December 2015, 53.

⁶³ Łodziński, S. (2017), op.cit.

⁶⁴ Similar question was asked by TNS OBOP between 1992 and 2008 – in the last study 48% of the respondents would let refugees stay in Poland for a longer time and 19% would let them settle permanently.

⁶⁵ Centre for Public Opinion Research (2017b), op.cit.


⁶⁶ See more: Górak-Sosnowska, K., Pachocka, M. (2018/2019).

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

heavily reported in various media⁶⁷ and political campaigns (for parliamentary and presidential elections) taking place in Poland. Themes related to the crisis and refugee reception were the main element of migration policy covered in candidates' media appearances. Also, in political parties' programs this issue was central to migration policy, while other matters (e.g. immigration as solution for demographic situation or Border Guard) were mentioned only in some programs⁶⁸.

Figure 6 Changes in attitudes towards refugees in Poland, 2015-2016



Source: Authors' own elaboration based on: Centre for Public Opinion Research (2017a). *Stosunek do przyjmowania uchodźców. Komunikat z badań*. January 2017, 1. Available at: https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_001_17.PDF (last visit: 24.06.2018).


Main national public opinion research centres did not probe about views on migration between 2008 and 2015. Prior to this, TNS OBOP – one of the main centres for social opinion research in Poland at that time – between 1992 and 2008 collected information on attitudes towards refugees. In 2008, 48% of respondents declared that they would let refugees stay in Poland for a longer time and 19% would

⁶⁷ Cekiera, R. (2017). Between hospitality and misoxenia—aftershocks of the migration crisis in Poland. *Political Preferences*, 17, pp. 237-250.

⁶⁸ Duszczyk, M. (2016). Ukrainian Crisis-is a redefinition of polish migration policy necessary? *Politeja*, 41, p. 37.

let them settle permanently. What is worth noting is that there was a shift towards more open attitudes towards refugees in the period between 2000–2008 (Figure 7 **Błąd! Nie można odnaleźć źródła odwołania.**).

Figure 7 Changes in attitudes towards refugees in Poland, 2000-2008



Source: Authors' own elaboration based on: TNS OBOP (2008). *Polacy o uchodźcach*. July 2008.


In 2016 GlobeScan for Amnesty International, Poland was among countries where respondents were least convinced that their government should do more to help refugees fleeing war or persecution (45% agreed, percentages were lower only in Russia, Thailand and India). Poland was also the second country (after Russia) with the highest percentage of respondents who would not let refugees into their country. Amnesty International developed the Refugees Welcome Index that is mean score of responses to the question: “How closely would you personally accept people fleeing war or persecution?”⁶⁹. Again, Poland scored among countries least open to refugees (Figure 8).

In Polish Prejudice Survey, refugees were the minority group (along with: Jews, Ukrainians, Roma, Germans, Muslims, Gays and lesbians) with which respondents had least contact with (both direct and indirect contact). This group was also one with the lowest level of acceptance as a neighbour, co-

⁶⁹ Responses have been scaled to 100 as follows: 0 = ‘I would refuse them entry to my country’; 33 = ‘In my country’; 67 = ‘In my city/town/village’; and 100 = ‘In my neighborhood or household’.

worker or spouse of respondent's family member. Percentage of respondents holding negative attitudes towards refugees grew between 2016 and 2017 more than in case of any other group included in the survey⁷⁰.

Figure 8 Refugees Welcome Index by Amnesty International in 2016



Source: Amnesty International (2016). *Refugees Welcome Survey 2016. Views of Citizens Across 27 Countries. Topline Report from GlobeScan.* May 2016. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT3041002016ENGLISH.PDF> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

Media discourse and stereotypes

According to the authors of the report on negative picture of Muslims in Polish press, Polish media discourse on immigration, immigrants and refugees seems to be focused on Muslims and Islam. Concepts such as “immigrants”, “refugees” and “Muslims” or “Arabs” are used interchangeably. In media these groups are frequently connected in texts with issues like “terrorism”, “fundamentalism” or “Islamists”. Authors observed that Polish newspapers present “a bundle of negative perceptions of

⁷⁰ Stefaniak, A., Malinowska, K., Witkowska, M. (2017). *Kontakt międzygrupowy i dystans społeczny w Polskim Sondżu Uprzedzeń 3.* Warszawa: Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami. Available at: http://cbu.psychologia.pl/uploads/PPS3_raporty/Stefaniak_Malinowska_Witkowska_Dystans&Kontakt.pdf (last visit: 24.06.2018).

Muslims” according to which they are equated with uncontrolled inflow of refugees, islamisation, clash of civilizations and terrorism⁷¹.

Especially new media⁷² are an area where data on immigration, immigrants and refugees can be in various ways manipulated. Simple and emotional Internet communications often diffuse fake news, which can be the main source of information for many Internet users⁷³. For example, Hall and Mikulska-Joles argue that information young people find on the Internet is one of the most important factors shaping anti-immigration attitudes⁷⁴. Respondents see Muslim immigrants/refugees as terrorists, criminals and rapists. This negative picture, created and/or sustained by media (especially new media), contributes to transforming fear into anti-immigrant postulates. These attitudes were connected i.a. with perception of Islam as Europe’s Other.

The analysis of Internet discourse published by the Centre for Public Opinion Research shows that majority (88%) of content related to immigrants, refugees and individuals granted international protection appeared in social media. Unsurprisingly, qualitative analysis showed that only minority of Polish Internet users hold positive attitude towards immigrants/refugees⁷⁵ and think that Poland should help these people. Out of 81% Internet users who are adverse to receiving immigrants, and the biggest percentage of respondents see the problem in their different culture and religion⁷⁶.

Behaviours

Number of hate crimes (xenophobic, racist and anti-Semitic) in Poland has been growing since 2000 (only 2007 was an exception). In the first half of 2017, there were 863 cases (566 new ones and 297 continued) run by Prosecutor's offices, and 31% of them were insults related to nationality, race, political option, religion or atheism; 29% were promoting fascism/other totalitarian systems/ideologies or public incitement to hatred; finally, 21% were about violence or threats related

⁷¹ Bertram, Ł., Puchejda, A., & Wigura, K. (2017). *Negatywny obraz muzułmanów w polskiej prasie. Analiza wybranych przykładów z lat 2015-2016*. Warszawa: Raport Obserwatorium Debaty Publicznej „Kultury Liberalnej”.

⁷² “(...) methods and social practices of communication, representation and expression that have developed using the digital, multimedia, networked computer (...)”. Source: Lister, M., Dovey, J., Giddings, S., Grant, I., Kelly, K. (2009). *New media: A critical introduction*. 2nd ed. London; New York: Routledge, p. 2.

⁷³ Cekiera, R. (2017)., op.cit.

⁷⁴ See more: Hall, D., Mikulska-Jolles, A. (2016). *Uprzedzenia, strach czy niewiedza? Młodzi Polacy o powodach niechęci do przyjmowania uchodźców. Analizy, Raporty, Ekspertyzy. Nr 1/2016*. Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej.

⁷⁵ Analysis indicates that words “immigrant” and “refugee” are in default used in relation with war in Syria.

⁷⁶ Centre for Public Opinion Research (2015). *Polacy o uchodźcach w internecie i w ‘realu’*. Komunikat z badań. November 2015, 149. Available at: http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_149_15.PDF (last visit: 24.06.2018).

to nationality, race, political option, religion or atheism⁷⁷. In addition, in its report from 2015, the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) noted that extremist political parties that existed in Poland so far had increased their ability to mobilize e.g. by establishing international networks or links with associations of racist football supporters. This growth of organizational/mobilization capacity results in extremist demonstrations (e.g. connected with Independence Day celebrated on 11 November in Poland). Other important problem that the ECRI noticed in Poland was hate speech in the media – both traditional ones and Internet⁷⁸. To this end, according to the information provided by the Centre for Public Opinion Research in 2016, refugees were the main addressees of hate speech⁷⁹.

Role of NGOs and cultural organizations in the context of migration

Poland is still seen by many rather as a transfer or short-term migration country than a country of destination. Low number of immigrants, especially those, who wish to stay in Poland for a longer period and character of migration (mostly young people looking for a job), results in low number of the NGOs, informal initiatives and cultural organizations acting in the field of migration. On the other hand, those of the migrants who wish to stay, or those who circulate, find themselves in a vulnerable position. They could benefit greatly from additional support which NGOs try to provide in a way “instead of” the state⁸⁰. Also, most organizations were established after year 2000, so relatively short period of their existence affects their goals and capability of creating an intercultural dialogue⁸¹. These organizations are usually located and concentrate their activities in big cities, where most immigrants live; it results in a situation where in some places we can observe a relatively large number of cultural

⁷⁷ National Public Prosecutor’s Office (2017). *Wyciąg ze sprawozdania dot. spraw o przestępstwa popełnione z pobudek rasistowskich, antysemickich lub ksenofobicznych prowadzonych w I półroczu 2017 roku w jednostkach organizacyjnych prokuratury*. 20 December 2017. Available at: <https://pk.gov.pl/dzialalnosc/sprawozdania-i-statystyki/wyciag-ze-sprawozdania-dot-spraw-o-przestepstwa-popelnione-pobudek-rasistowskich-antysemickich-lub-ksenofobicznych-prowadzonych-polroczu-2017-roku-jednostkach-organizacyjnych-prokuratury/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁷⁸ Council of Europe: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (2015). *ECRI report on Poland (fifth monitoring cycle)*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI).

⁷⁹ Winiewski, M., Hansen, K., Bilewicz, M., Soral, W., Świdowska, A., Bulska, D. (2016). *Mowa nienawiści, mowa pogardy. Raport z badania przemocy werbalnej wobec grup mniejszościowych*. Available at: http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/pdf/MOWA_NIENAWISCI_MOWA_POGARDY_INTERNET.pdf (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁸⁰ Józwiak, I., Sanchez-Dominguez, M., Sorando, D. (2018). *Mainstreaming by Accident in the New-Migration Countries: The Role of NGOs in Spain and Poland*. In: Scholten, P., van Breugel, I. (eds.). *Mainstreaming Integration Governance New Trends in Migrant Integration Policies in Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 47-70.

⁸¹ Piłat, A., Segeš Frelak, J. (2015). Organizacje migranckie w Polsce. *Trzeci sektor*, 35 (2).

initiatives and lack of them in the rest of the country. Unfortunately, almost all the activities are project-based⁸² and we cannot amount to a sustainable and long-term strategy or cooperation with local institutions. Nonetheless some local authorities provide grants and donations to organizations promoting migrants' culture and multiculturalism or participate in organization of multicultural festivals and events (e.g. Warsaw and its "small grants" program or "Warsaw's Multicultural Street Party" Festival).

Poland is "characterized by a weak welfare state in which there is a large dependency on civil society to meet social needs of the population. (...) The case of Poland (...), is a remarkable example of the dismantling of a communist-type (state socialism) welfare state. At present, the neoliberal predominance fuels the weakness of the welfare policies (...). This, in turn, strengthens the role of the families and neighbourhood networks, as well as the NGOs"⁸³. As a result, it is claimed that instead of a special support, the NGOs try to direct migrants to make use of the means at disposal of regular citizens, as the special support is scarce. "We can speak of an empty universalism which leads to accidental mainstreaming"⁸⁴.

Once we established that the state does not engage in a systematic, strategic way in the integration process in Poland, and that it has been "implicitly delegated" to the third sector, the biggest issue becomes the funding for the NGOs. So far and throughout the 2000s the European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals (EFI) and the European Refugee Fund (ERF) were the basic sources of funding for the activities connected with foreigners. Albeit itself problematic (project logic hindering systematic operation, problems with tranches, lack of possibility to address seasonal and circular migrants within EFI, crucial in Poland⁸⁵), EFI offered at least funding and a degree of relative stability for the NGOs who specialized and were quite effective in reaching out to foreigners⁸⁶. A new EU financial instrument set up for the period 2014-2020 is the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) responsible for promotion of "the efficient management of migration flows and the

⁸² Pawlak, M., Matusz-Protasiewicz, P. (2015). Organizacje pozarządowe wobec cudzoziemców w Polsce – od pomocy doraźnej do upowszechniania europejskiej ramy polityki integracji. *Trzeci Sektor*, 35 (2).

⁸³ Józwiak, I., Sanchez-Dominguez, M., Sorando, D. (2018), op.cit.

⁸⁴ Ibidem.

⁸⁵ See more: Lesińska, M., Stefańska, R. (2015). Wpływ organizacji pozarządowych na politykę migracyjną Polski i jego uwarunkowania. *Trzeci Sektor*, 35 (2); Józwiak, I., Sanchez-Dominguez, M., Sorando, D. (2018), op.cit.

⁸⁶ Kościeszka, K. (2014). *EFI i EFU – blaski i cienie*. Info-migrator.pl. Available at: <http://www.ekspert.info-migrator.pl/warto-poczytac-ekspert/672-finansowanie-projekt%C3%B3w-migracyjnych/473-efi-i-efu-blaski-i-cienie> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

implementation, strengthening and development of a common Union approach to asylum and immigration”⁸⁷.

Since late 2015, the the new populist and right-wing government from the Law and Justice Party has been limiting NGOs’ access to AMIF in different ways which hinders their activity. It can be considered a part of a bigger campaign against the NGOs who are dubbed “lefty” (e.g. national TV news discusses financial allegations against prominent NGOs, in a similar manner that NGOs sponsored by George Soros are persecuted in Hungary). There is a general shift from delegating the funds for the NGOs by local governments to centralizing them under an umbrella of National Freedom Institute (pol. *Narodowy Instytut Wolności*) and only “right-(wing)-thinking” organizations can hope for generous funding⁸⁸. Similar issues also pertain to the support of Poles abroad – funding is granted only to “correct” NGOs or actually, Government-Organized NGOs or Quasi-NGOs (GONGOs/QUANGOs). Shrinking resources exacerbate the competition between NGOs and hinder their collaboration, like in other fields as well. Important NGOs supporting foreigners for years, like the Association for Legal Intervention, have publicized this problem and illustrated their attempts and struggles for the funding in the post-2015 era⁸⁹. Despite the difficulties and struggles described above, there are worthwhile initiatives by NGOs and local governments, that address the integration of foreigners and we present selected examples in following section.

Presence of good practices

In the light of the challenges faced by the NGOs, it is important to discuss how their and some local governments’ efforts were successful in terms of establishing long-term programs but also, how civil society mobilizes in the context of recent developments in the EU and Poland (e.g. the migration and refugee crisis in Europe and the new ruling party in Poland). We should keep in mind that some of the activities are concerned about the systematic inclusion of foreigners by the means of political and

⁸⁷ European Commission: DG HOME (2018). *Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)*. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/asylum-migration-integration-fund_en (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁸⁸ Kulik., E. (2017). *Do czego prowadzą nas władze? Cel jest jasny*. Ngo.pl. Available at: <http://opinie.ngo.pl/wiadomosc/2125948.html> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁸⁹ Klaus, W., Ostaszewska-Żuk, E., Szczepanik, M. (2017). *Fundusze europejskie i ich rola we wspieraniu integracji cudzoziemców w Polsce*. Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej. Available at: https://interwencjaprawna.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/raport_po-FAMI_net.pdf (last visit: 24.06.2018), Fundacja na rzecz Różnorodności Społecznej (FRS) (2018). *FAMI (Fundusz Azylu Migracji i Integracji)*. Available at: <http://ffrs.org.pl/reagujemyfami/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

social inclusion (local governments and institutions participatory initiatives), some are directed more at the society as a whole (education and inspiring public debates), some are focused on providing direct support, material or financial, to foreigners in dire need, in Poland and elsewhere. The list of organizations presented below is by no means exhaustive and is purposefully focused on Warsaw⁹⁰. Above all, it should be noted that there are scarcely any grassroots NGOs established by the migrants themselves⁹¹, who could effectively fight for their rights like in the case of other countries (Italy, the UK, Germany), also in case of Poles mobilizing abroad⁹².

As an exception we would like to describe Foundation “Our Choice” (pol. *Nasz Wybór*). This is a good example of an organization which underwent a transformation from informal group established by a group of Polish-Ukrainian friends into a formal and legal organization. The main goals of the Foundation include integration of Ukrainians living in Poland, cultural development and supporting educational, economic and political contacts between Poles and Ukrainians. The Foundation runs so-called “Ukrainian House” which is a place to build and connect Ukrainian community living in Warsaw, where immigrants can find a space for their activities, including cultural ones, meet their countrymen, artists or exchange information and experiences. It is also a place where many cultural projects promoting Ukrainian culture and tradition have been held so far⁹³. The Foundation also provides a devoted Internet portal in Ukrainian⁹⁴.

Local governments and institutions’ long-term participatory initiatives

One of the good examples of the promotion of mutual understanding and inclusion of immigrants into the local society is the Committee for Social Dialogue for Foreigners (pol. *Komisja Dialogu Społecznego ds. Cudzoziemców – KDS*) at the Warsaw City Council’s Centre of Social Communication. KDS, as an initiatory and advisory body in matters related to foreigners, consists of

⁹⁰ See more: Polish Migration Forum (2018). *NGOs for migrants*. Available at: <http://www.forummigracyjne.org/en/aktualnosci.php?news=356&wid=32> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁹¹ For those working in the domestic and care sector, see more: Kindler, M., Kordasiewicz, A., Szulecka, M. (2016). *Care needs and migration for domestic work: Ukraine-Poland*. Geneva: International Labour Office. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---sro-budapest/documents/publication/wcms_503749.pdf (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁹² See e.g. Kordasiewicz, A., Sadura, P. (2017). Migrations, engagement and integration of Poles in the UK and in London Borough of Lewisham – research and data review within the Londoner-Pole-Citizen Project. *CMR Working Papers*, 100(158).

⁹³ Popil, D. (2015). Fundacja “Nasz Wybór”. *Trzeci Sektor*, 35(2); Ukraiński Dom w Warszawie (2018). Available at: <https://ukrainiskidom.pl/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁹⁴ “Nasz Wybór”. Available at: <http://naszwybir.pl/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

formal and informal organizations representing foreigners, providing various types of support for them or promoting multiculturalism. Thanks to its role and prerogatives it can have real impact on the local policy, including the cultural aspect of integration of foreigners⁹⁵. In Warsaw there is also the Multicultural Centre⁹⁶, a long-term project delegated to NGOs about running a centre tending to the needs of foreigners.

Among interesting endeavours of local governments a prominent example is that of Gdańsk, a seaside city in the north of Poland, that has implemented a strategic programme titled “Immigrant Integration Model”⁹⁷, entailing i.a. education, employment, culture, discrimination and housing to cover the many dimensions important to foreigners living in Gdańsk. Moreover, in 2016 an Immigrants’ Council was also established, a consultative collective body composed of 13 representatives of foreigners, advising the president of Gdańsk⁹⁸.

Among long-term initiatives we would also like to draw attention to long lasting integration program targeted at foreigners’ children, including refugees, offered by the Bednarska School Complex in Warsaw. It is one of the best primary and secondary schools in Poland led by an NGO. It was established soon after the 1989 transition as the first non-public school after the World War II in Poland. Since the 1990s the school provides a comprehensive and free of charge educational programme aimed at involving and integrating children coming from other countries⁹⁹. It is worth to mention another interesting school initiative – an everyday activity of the Public Schools Complex in Mroków (Warsaw’s suburb), characterized by a large Asian population among pupils. Mroków Complex is open to diversity and inclusion of foreign children who constitute almost 1/5 of the pupils (they are mostly Chinese and Vietnamese). Consequently, the school offers cultural assistance to its

⁹⁵ Komisja Dialogu Społecznego (2012). *Regulamin Komisji Dialogu Społecznego ds. Cudzoziemców przy Centrum Komunikacji Społecznej Urzędu m.st. Warszawa*. Available at: http://ngo.um.warszawa.pl/sites/ngo2.um.warszawa.pl/files/zalaczniki/dokumenty/kds_cudzoziemcy_regulamin_2012.pdf (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁹⁶ Centrum Wielokulturowe. Available at: <https://centrumwielokulturowe.waw.pl/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁹⁷ Portal Miasta Gdańska (2018). *Migracje*. Available at: <http://www.gdansk.pl/migracje> (last visit: 24.06.2018); Gdansk City Hall (2016). *Immigrant Integration Model*. Gdansk City Hall.

⁹⁸ Urząd Miejski w Gdańsku (2018). *Rada Imigrantów i Imigrantek*. Available at: <https://bip.gdansk.pl/prezydent-miasta/gdanskie-rady/Rada-Imigrantow-i-Imigrantek,a,2747> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

⁹⁹ Winnicka, E., Jak sobie radzą w polskich szkołach dzieci imigrantów. Kolorowanie białoczerwonego. *Polityka*, 8 November 2015. Available at: <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/spoleczenstwo/1639615,1,jak-sobie-radza-w-polskich-szkolach-dzieci-imigrantow.read> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)

pupils, special linguistic support for migrant children as well as intercultural activities and training for the teachers and parents¹⁰⁰.

Education and inspiring public debates

There are several NGOs which systematically engage in educational activities and aim at bettering the discursive image of a foreigner, discussing the prejudices and racism. Among them we can list the Foundation for Social Diversity which specializes in organizing debates, discussions and campaigns around the issues of diversity, otherness, migration, as well as some micro activities at schools with foreigners, i.a. through elaborating the School Codes of Equal Treatment¹⁰¹. The Foundation also uses the language of the cinema to share the story of migration, diversity and tolerance with the Polish society – it was the case with a cycle of film seminars titled “Guests, guests” organized in Warsaw in 2016¹⁰². Teatr Powszechny and Strefa Wolnościowa cooperating with this theatre are also important facilitators and initiators of artistic and discursive endeavours actively involving the foreigners living in Poland and opening debates about otherness in Polish society¹⁰³.

One should also note the several attempts at counter-acting the prevalent xenophobic discourse, already in 2015, centred around a wide social initiative “With bread and salt” (“pol. “Chlebem i Solą” [a traditional old-Polish greeting of the newcomers or guests], which apart from actions and manifestations of support in 2015 and subsequent years, established an information portal www.uchodzcy.info containing basic information about refugees and migrants presented in an accessible way.

Direct support

There are some organizations providing extensive direct support to foreigners in Poland, in various areas, including: legal advice, Polish courses and cultural courses, housing advice, consultancy in the field of economic activity. They are mostly located in big cities such as Warsaw, Lublin, Poznań or

¹⁰⁰ ZSP Mroków (2015). *Asystenci kulturowi*. Available at: <https://zspmrokow.pl/2015-11-06-17-52-26/2015-11-06-17-57-18> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

¹⁰¹ Foundation for Social Diversity (FSD). Available at: <http://ffrs.org.pl/en/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

¹⁰² Kultura Liberalna (2018). *Niepotrzebna Europa? – zakończenie cyklu spotkań filmowych nt. współczesnej migracji*. Available at: <https://kulturaliberalna.pl/events/niepotrzebna-europa-seminarium/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

¹⁰³ Strefa Wolnościowa (2018). Available at: <http://strefawolnoslowa.pl/> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

Cracow. Among them, it is worth mentioning: Association of Legal Intervention, Ocalenie Foundation, Halina Niec Legal Assistance Center, Refugee Counselling Center of the Polish Humanitarian Organization, Polish Migration Forum, Foundation for Somalia, A-venir Foundation, One World Association - Service Civil International Poland. Direct support of a strategic importance for refugees is housing because the prices of apartments and even single rooms are high, as well as foreigners often experience reluctance from the landlords to allow them to rent. Among direct action initiatives, especially in connection with the migration crisis, there were some spontaneous calls for material or financial support for the migrants and refugees on the so-called Balkan route and those coming to Poland. One of such initiatives is Refugees Welcome Polska coordinated by the Ocalenie Foundation from Warsaw since November 2016¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰⁴ Refugees Welcome (2018). Available at: <http://refugees-welcome.pl/?lang=en> (last visit: 24.06.2018).

Atlas of Transitions

New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe (2017- 2020)